At the heart of Intel's malaises is its loss-making FAB division. If Intel can succeed in divesting this segment, it could swiftly return to profitability. These fabrication facilities not only produce chips for Intel but also serve as foundries for other companies. Competing against industry titans like TSMC and Samsung, Intel faces a daunting uphill battle.

Intel's FAB division grapples with two core issues. First, many of its major clients, including Apple, Nvidia, Qualcomm, and AMD, see Intel as a competitor and are reluctant to outsource manufacturing to the company. Second, Intel’s delay in advancing its Fab 42 project in 2014 allowed competitors like TSMC to leapfrog ahead.

With TSMC under the leadership of Liang Mong-song, that company implemented an aggressive work schedule that pushed its technology advancements to achieve a 10-nanometer process node within just two and a half years. In contrast, Intel barely managed to work 30 hours a week in the same period and took nearly a decade to stabilize its 10-nanometer yields. This performance gap illustrates the competitive disadvantages Intel is currently facing.

Recognizing the urgency of the situation, the U.S. government has been proactive in supporting Intel. Substantial subsidies have been offered, and the latest lithography machines from ASML are prioritized for Intel. With Intel being the only semiconductor firm in the U.S. possessing true technological competitiveness, these efforts underscore the importance placed on strengthening domestic capabilities, even as TSMC and Samsung establish operations on American soil.

In seeking a path to survival, it seems Intel must consider spinning off its FAB unit. However, offloading this division to one of its primary competitors, like TSMC or Samsung, would be off the table. Instead, it would likely seek a domestic company capable of acquiring it or forming a joint venture. Qualcomm appears to be under consideration for this crucial task.

A full acquisition by Qualcomm would not address the core issues at play. Merely transferring ownership without reforming the business strategy would yield little improvement. The only viable path forward may involve establishing a standalone FAB, taking cues from TSMC in terms of customer relations and operational practices. If Intel continues to function merely as a welfare entity for competitors, it risks spiraling further into irrelevance.

Nevertheless, even if Intel were willing to pursue a sale, such a massive transaction would inevitably attract scrutiny from antitrust regulators. Given the U.S. government's current push for advanced chip initiatives, it would likely seek out ways to navigate the complexities of domestic antitrust laws.

Additionally, according to Chinese law, any merger involving foreign companies with global revenues exceeding 10 billion yuan, or with Chinese market revenues over 400 million yuan, will trigger antitrust reviews. If Qualcomm were to acquire Intel, it would likely encounter barriers to approval from Chinese regulators.

Looking ahead, Intel has staked its future on the success of its next-generation 18A semiconductor production line. This anticipated 1.8-nanometer line encompasses a host of innovations such as 3D hybrid bonding technology, nanosheet transistors, and backside contact technology.

Set to begin production in 2025, the success of the 18A line is pivotal. A successful rollout would see Intel reclaim its status among the elite of semiconductor manufacturers, but failure could severely damage the broader initiative to revive domestic production.